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THE SIMPLIFIED EMPLOYEE PENSION: AN
INCREASINGLY ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE




When Congress added subsection (k) to § 408 of the Internal Revenue Code,
thus creating a new kind of qualified retirement plan based upon Individual
Retirement Accounts,' it did so believing that other forms of qualified retirement
plans had already become complicated enough to discourage implementation
despite substantial tax attractions.2 Congress predicated qualification upon a short
set of rules compatible with the "do-it-yourself" IRA vehicle introduced in 1974
underERISA. In so doing, Congress provided an alternative to the long and detailed
set of rules under I.R.C. § 401(a), the formidable wasteland which must be traveled
to attain (and retain) tax benefits for standard pension, profit sharing, and other
popular retirement savings plans.
In one regard, creation of the simplified employee pension (SEP) as a
retirement savings alternative actually added to the complexity faced by tax advisors
and potential plan sponsors. Because the two distinct sets of rules under I.R.C. § 408
and 401(a) do not afford identical opportunities for plan design, a knowledgeable
choice between the two can be exercised only after carefully weighing the complexi-
ties of the latter, under particular circumstances, against the relative loss of planning
flexibility associated with the former.
In other words, choosing a simplified employee pension over more compli-
cated retirement plans will result in easier plan administration, but only after a rather
complicated planning decision has been made. This planning decision cannot be
intelligently made without a full understanding of both the plan administration
*Richard]. Kovach, A.B. 1970, Oberlin College, J.D. 1974, Harvard Law School, is Professor of Law at the
University of Akron School of Law. The author is grateful for the financial support received to write this
article from the Center for Taxation Studies at The University of Akron.
'Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 152, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978). Subsequent textual and footnote
references to the Internal Revenue Code will be expressed in the form "I.R.C. § __ . I
2 S. REP. No. 600, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6791,6855
states: "The committee is aware that many qualified pension plans have been terminated in the recent past,
due, in part, to the complex and burdensome rules they are required to satisfy. The committee believes that
these rules have also had the effect of retarding the introduction of new pension plans."
' Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
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complexities avoided and the plan design features (and potential cost savings)
foregone as a result of implementing the simplified format. Furthermore, the
planning decision may not constitute a one-time headache; the changing circum-
stances of a sponsoring employer may necessitate a reevaluation that could result in
terminating the plan chosen and implementing a different kind of plan.'
Logically, the simplified employee pension will become an increasingly
attractive choice as I.R.C. § 401(a) plans continue to be subjected to more complex
and restrictive regulation, 5 and as a growing number of plan sponsors view the
perceived design advantages of more complicated plans as insignificant.6 Indeed,
at some point, Congress may be urged to eliminate at least some forms of I.R.C.
§ 401(a) plans--perhaps all defined contribution plans--in a move towards ultimate
simplification that will leave the simplified employee pension as the only practical
alternative for employers who wish to promote tax-favored retirement savings.
Such a prospect might become more palatable if Congress were to implement
a few more changes to I.R.C. § 408, directed toward a further narrowing of the
current design and cost savings gaps between the SEP and I.R.C. 401 (a) plans. The
purpose of this Article is to comment upon these existing differences and suggest
potential changes in the SEP legislative scheme that would encourage a widespread
abandonment and possible legislative elimination of more complicated retirement
plans.
Congress has already expressed a willingness to tinker with the SEP rules so
as to broaden the simplified pension's appeal. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986,7
the SEP scheme was amended to permit cash or deferred arrangements that serve as
a limited alternative to I.R.C. § 401(k) plans.8 From a policy perspective favoring
4 Examples of such changing circumstances include a substantial reduction (or expansion) of an employer's
workforce, an acceleration (or deceleration) of the employees' turnover rate, and the introduction (or
cessation) of the collective bargaining process respecting retirement benefits.
' At the time this article was written, pension practitioners were most notably struggling to understand the
voluminous "Nondiscrimination Regulations" issued under I.R.C. § 401(a)(4)(1990). Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a)(4)(1991).
Both public and professional attitudes toward tax complexity were explored in recent surveys conducted
by The University of Akron Center for Taxation Studies. One survey, involving 601 members of the tax
sections of the American Bar Association and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
indicated that fifty-five percent of its respondents thought that complexity of the Internal Revenue Code was
an "extremely serious problem" for American government. Seventy-three percent of respondents believed
that the Tax Reform Act of 1986, (Pub. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986)), which significantly affected
qualified retirement plans, had made tax law "alot more complex", and sixty percent of respondents faced
complaints about tax complexity from more than half of their client base. UNivEsrrv op AKRoN CINR FOR
TAXATiON STUms REPORT, CoMn4'axrry AND COM]'.ANCE CONSEQUENCES OF ThE 1986 TAx REFoRm Acr 12,13,
and 20 (March, 1989).
7 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
'Unfortunately, I.R.C. § 408(k)(6)(B) (1990) disallows SEP cash or deferred arrangements if the employer
has more than 25 eligible employees at a designated time. Consequently, employers having a greater
numberof employees are left to choose only an I.R.C. § 401(k) (1990) cash or deferred arrangement, which
means that the plan must meet the complex requirements of both I.R.C. § 401(k) (1990) and I.R.C. § 401(a)
(1990). See I.R.C. § 401 (k)(1) (1990).
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SIMPLIFIED EMPLOYEE PENSION
simplification of tax benefits, further changes to increase the attractiveness of
simplified employee pensions should be encouraged.
Even if the SEP rules remain unaltered for the next several years, employers
will want to continue questioning whether their retirement contribution objectives
are best served by conventional plans that are increasingly more difficult to
administer and keep tax-qualified.9 In effect, the SEP may become more attractive
by default, as I.R.C. § 401(a) plans continue to become less attractive as a result of
the overly complex legislative and regulatory tinkering to which they are subject.
Practitioners should reconsider this point when reviewing each new change or
interpretation of law affecting standard qualified retirement plans.
The discussion that follows is organized under headings reflecting the major
plan design differences that distinguish the SEP from its more complicated
alternatives.
PARTICIPATION STANDARDS
Participation standards for non-SEP retirement plans are set forth in I.R.C.
§§ 401(a)(26) and 410. Those sections permit significant individually designed
exclusions from participation through a complex interaction of a number of rules and
subrules, including allowance for "statutory" exclusions based on age, length of
service, and an employee's status as a nonresident alien or member of a collective
bargaining unit.10 Three of these four designated categories of exclusion are fully
incorporated into the SEP participation standards,1 leaving the length of service
criterion as a key distinction between the SEP and I.R.C. § 401(a) plans.
Whereas a simplified employee pension predicates participation upon per-
formance of any service by an employee during at least three of the immediately
preceding five calendar years,' 2 I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(A) permits a plan to require an
employee to complete a "year of service," defined in I.R.C. § 410(a)(3) as 1000 hours
of service, within a designated 12-month period, in order to be eligible to participate.
Thus, no matter how long a worker has been employed, he or she can be excluded
from participation in an I.R.C. § 401(a) plan as long as his or her status remains "part-
time" within the 1000 hour standard. Part-time workers of an employer adopting a
simplified employee pension can be excluded from the plan only in years during
'Internal Revenue Service audit activity against qualified retirement plans can be extremely focused at
times. Recently, the I.R.S. targeted 18,000 plans under its "small plan actuarial program." Robert Brauer,
I.R.S. Assistant Commissioner for Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations, commented on April 3,1990
respecting this program: "We have over 30 cases in litigation on those issues. Every case that has been
completed has been resolved on terms highly favorable to the government." LEXIS, Tax Analysts, "Tax
Notes Today," April 4, 1990.
10 I.R.C. § 410(a)(l), (b)(3)(A),(C) (1990).
1 I.R.C. § 408(k)(2) (1990).
12 I.R.C. § 408(k)(2)(B) (1990).
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which their compensation is less than $300,13 once the age and three-in-five years
service requirement are met.
Since many I.R.C. § 401 (a) plans rely only upon the" statutory" exclusions to
define their participation requirements, any participation-related cost savings ad-
vantage of such plans over simplified employee pensions results solely from this
disparate treatment of part-time employees. However, in particular cases, no such
advantage can be automatically assumed, because part-time employees earning
more than $300 per year might nonetheless be excluded from a simplified employee
pension if their duration of employment fails to meet the three-in-five years
standard.' 4 To the extent part-time employees for a particular employer or in a
particular industry tend to have a moderately frequent turnover rate, an employer's
ability to exclude employees who work less than 1000 hours per year becomes less
significant as a cost savings incentive for choosing a conventional retirement savings
vehicle over a simplified employee pension.
Respecting employers who would achieve significant cost savings by exclud-
ing from participation employees who work fewer than 1000 hours per year, the SEP
rules might easily be amended to provide relief, simply by increasing the $300 base
compensation limitation to some higher amount that permits more than a de minimis
exclusion of part-time workers with longer durations of employment. For example,
the compensation base could be expressed as a multiple of the minimum wage.' In
any event, the best way to address the disparate treatment of part-time workers via
legislative changes to I.R.C. § 408(k) would be to focus on compensation earned,
rather than to incorporate an hours of service standard into the SEP rules. The latter
concept carries substantial regulatory baggage' 6 while employers would undoubt-
edly find it easy to determine exclusions under a uniform definition of compensa-
tion. 17
With respect to employer-designed exclusions now permitted for I.R.C.
13 I.R.C. § 408(k)(8) (1990) permits the $300 amount to rise with inflation.
14 Of course, many businesses, such as restaurants, experience a high turnover rate among part-time
employees, with the result that very few part-time employees will perform service for the employer
throughout any three year period.
" To illustrate, the dollar limitation could be expressed as 1000 times the current hourly minimum wage,
which limitation would be consistent with the I.R.C. § 410(a)(3)(A) (1990) definition ofa "year of service."
Or, the limitation could be set at 500 times the current hourly minimum wage, making it consistent with the
500 hours definition of a "break in service" set forth in I.R.C. § 411(a)(6)(A) (1990) and I.R.C.
§ 410(a)(5)(C) § (1990).
"A review of the voluminous computation of service regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor
at 29 C.F.R. § 2530.200b-1-8 (1991) makes this point well.
" The Internal Revenue Code contains a statutory definition of compensation at I.R.C. § 414(q)(7) (1990),
which is applicable to the "highly compensated employee" concept generally defined in I.R.C. § 414(q)
(1990) and used primarily for purposes of minimum coverage testing under I.R.C. § 410(b) (1990) and the
prohibition of discrimination against rank and file employees expressed in I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1990). The
definition also applies to the $300 in compensation SEP participation standard by express reference in I.R.C.
§ 408(k)(2)(C) (1990).
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§ 401(a) plans under I.R.C. § 410(b)(1), the SEP ostensibly suffers a distinct
disadvantage. This is largely because many employers who have undertaken the
complexities of the § 410(b)(1) rules would likely find that a switch to the SEP three-
in-five years rule would substantially increase plan coverage and thus funding
costs.' Consequently, if the SEP is to have appeal for such employers, I.R.C.
§ 408(k) would have to be altered to permit at least some prospect for employer-
designed participation exclusions.
The inherent complexities of the "average benefit percentage test" of I.R.C.
§ 410(b)(2) and the "line of business exception" of I.R.C. § 410(b)(5) make these
provisions unlikely candidates for incorporation into the simplified employee
pension rules.' 9 Between the two "safe harbor", mechanical coverage rules of I.R.C.
§ 410(b)(1), that contained in I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B), 20 if transferred into the SEP
rules, would probably best serve the interests of employers who wish to preserve
coverage design flexibility and avoid undue complexity, particularly if the SEP rules
remained free from the onerous strictures of I.R.C. § 401(a)(26).21 This is because
the employer can decide to eliminate certain highly compensated employees from
coverage as a "leveraged" means to greatly reduce the number of rank and file
employees who must be covered, thus, in many cases, permitting a qualified plan to
cover only a fraction of the employer's workforce, if desired. 22 In effect, the I.R.C.
" For example, if an employer were using I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(A) (1990), the simplest of the minimum
coverage rules, to exclude from plan participation the employees of a particular division containing as many
as thirty percent of the employer's otherwise eligible employees, switching to a simplified employee
pension would create an obligation to cover any employee in such division who meets the I.R.C. § 408(k)(2)
(1990) criteria. On the other hand, any employee otherwise covered under the seventy percent standard of
I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(A) (1990) who did not meet the I.R.C. § 408(k)(2) (1990) criteria could have been
excluded from coverage under a simplified employee pension. This dual effect would have to be translated
into a contributions cost differential in order to gauge the effect of such a hypothetical substitution of plans.
" In addition to the "nondiscriminatory classification" concept mentioned hereafter and incorporated at
I.R.C. § 410(b)(2)(A)(i) (1990) and I.R.C. § 410(b)(5)(B) (1990), these coverage provisions present other
definitional problems, such as that associated with the "line of business" concept. The "line of business"
concept was considered difficult enough that the conference report pertaining.to I.R.C. § 41 0(b)(5) (1990)
contained a detailed explanation of it, as well as multiple references to clarifying regulations to be prom-
ulgated by the Treasury Department. H. R. CONF. REP. No. 841,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-523-526, reprinted
in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4075, 4611-4614.20 I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B) (1990) permits a plan to cover only as many rank and file employees as constitute
a percentage of all such employees equal to 70 percent of the percentage of highly compensated employees
who are covered.
21 It might be argued that there would be less need to retain l.R.C. § 401 (a)(26) (1990), which requires a plan
to cover a minimum of 50 employees (or, if less, 40 percent of all nonexcludable employees), in the event
that Congress would streamline the minimum coverage requirements by getting rid of those coverage
standards that create the most potential for abuse, such as the "average benefit percentage test" of I.R.C.
§ 410(b)(2) (1990). The existence of I.R.C. § 401 (a)(26) (1990) as a separate participation coverage test
seems, in any event, to suggest that the coverage tests of I.R.C. § 401 (b) (1990) are deficient. A better cure
for such deficiency than retention of I.R.C. § 401 (a)(26) (1990) would be to directly simplify the I.R.C.
§ 410(b) (1990) standards.
'The virtue of I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B) (1990) is that it permits an employer to reduce coverage substantially,
simply by excluding some of its highly compensated employees from plan coverage. Of course, any highly
compensated employees thus sacrificed can be compensated handsomely outside the plan with additional
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§ 410(b)(1)(B) rule permits something like the limited coverage available under the
complicated I.R.C. Section 4 10(b)(2) and (5) rules, but without the need to make the
facts and circumstances determination of a proper "nondiscriminatory classifica-
tion" required by these latter rules. 23
Although the "classification" concept permits employers to include a greater
number of highly compensated employees in the designated coverage group than
might otherwise be allowed under I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B), the uncertainty and
complexity occasioned by the concept strongly favors its ultimate demise. By
contrast, the I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B) rule is quite simple in its application, and from
a policy perspective it could easily be altered to meet either a more liberal or more
conservative view of the desirable coverage flexibility that should be accorded plan
sponsors.24 Properly incorporated into the SEP rules, the I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B)
concept could greatly contribute to the obsolescence of I.R.C. § 410(a) plans respect-
ing participation standards.
VESTING
Vesting as a cost savings mechanism for I.R.C. § 401(a) plans may already be
greatly overrated as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,25 which substantially
reduced permitted vesting schedules under I.R.C. § 411. In theory, accrued benefits
forfeited by departing employees under vesting schedules constitute either offsets
against employer contributions or, if employer contributions are left constant, aug-
ment the accrued benefits of plan participants who remain with the employer. In
either case, the economic benefit of vesting forfeitures is dependent upon the extent
and frequency of employee turnover.
Unfortunately, high employee turnover also invokes potential technical prob-
lems affecting a plan's qualified status. These problems include potential discrimi-
nation against rank and file employees under I.R.C. § 401 (a)(4), partial terminations
that require accelerated vesting for affected employees under I.R.C. § 411(d)(3), and
difficulties in crediting service for reemployed plan participants under I.R.C.
§ 411 (a)(6) and (7).26 Thus, the cost savings associated with vesting schedules are
23 The Treasury Department's latest attempt to define a nondiscriminatory classification is contained in
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-4, 54 Fed. Reg. 21, 437 (1989).
24 For example, if Congress wished to provide for strictly proportionate coverage for rank and file
employees, the 70 percent ratio could be increased to 100 percent. Thus, if an employer had an eligible
workforce of ten highly compensated employees and ninety rank and file employees, it could avoid plan
coverage for forty-five of the rank and file employees by excluding five highly compensated employees
from coverage. Under I.R.C. § 410(b)(l)(B) (1990) as it now exists, eliminating five highly compensated
employees would permit exclusion of fifty-eight rank and file employees. However, I.R.C. § 401 (a)(26)
(1990) would require that the plan cover at least forty employees altogether.
" Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).2 6 For a detailed discussion of these problems see Kovach, Qualified Retirement Plans for Small Businesses:
An Evaluation of the Utility of Vesting Schedules After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 93 DIcK. L. REv. 497
(1989).
[Vol. 8AKRON TAX JOURNAL
6
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 8 [1991], Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol8/iss1/4
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achieved by encountering a great deal of regulatory complexity and some risk of
exposure to loss of a plan's special tax benefits.
These problems do not affect a simplified employee pension, because I.R.C.
§ 408(k)(1) defines the SEP as an employee's Individual Retirement Account, and
I.R.C. § 408 (a)(4) requires that an interest in an Individual Retirement Account be
nonforfeitable. No doubt this feature should notbe altered, since introducing vesting
rules into the SEP would not be consistent with keeping it" simple." But if the SEP
were to supplant existing I.R.C. § 401(a) defined contribution plans, many plan
sponsors would nonetheless lament the loss of vesting schedules, believing that, cost
savings aside, vesting promotes a personnel policy of rewarding extended service
while discouraging deleterious employee turnover.
A response to this concern might be twofold: First, permitted vesting
schedules under current law are already so short (three, five, six, or at most, seven
years)2 that significant rewards via vesting for truly long and faithful service are
simply unavailable in any event. Second, probationary employees not destined to
become members of an employer's long term workforce are likely to terminate
service after only a few months of employment in many industries. The three-in-five
years participation standard of I.R.C. § 408(k)(2)(B), left intact, would be more than
sufficient to prevent such employees from sharing in employer contributions in any
event. Many employees who would meet the three-in-five years test and become
eligible to share in employer contributions under a simplified employee pension
would also eventually accumulate sufficient service to achieve full or substantial
vesting under currently permitted vesting schedules. The fact that some employees
might terminate service after working three years for an employer--but prior to
earning the years of service necessary for substantial vesting under currently
permitted schedules--hardly seems sufficient to justify retention of inordinately
complicated vesting rules under a revised SEP scheme.
DEDUCTION/CONTRIBUTION LIMITATIONS
For some plan sponsors, a key economic disparity between the simplified
employee pension and I.R.C. § 401(a) defined contribution plans results from the
more restrictive limitation on employer contributions applicable to the SEP. Under
I.R.C. § 404(h), the amount deductible in a taxable year for a simplified employee
pension cannot exceed 15 percent of the total compensation paid to participating em-
ployees. Moreover, I.R.C. § 402(h) provides that contributions made on behalf of
any one employee cannot exceed the lesser of 15 percent of the employee's compen-
sation or the I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A) limitation, a base amount set at $30O.'
- I.R.C. 411(a)(2) (1990) and I.R.C. § 416(b)(1) (1990).
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I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A) and (B) set contribution limitations for conventional
defined contribution plans as the lesser of the $30,000 "dollar" limit or 25 percent
of the participant's compensation. This creates a potential 10 percent disparity that,
when considered with the I.R.C. § 404 deduction limitations applicable to conven-
tional defined contribution plans, applies to profit sharing and stock bonus plans, as
well as simplified employee pensions, but not to money purchase pension plans.2 9
Interestingly, this distinction among I.R.C. § 401 (a) defined contribution plan
formats has meant that plan sponsors wishing to make deductible contributions that
take advantage of the I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(B) 25 percent limitation must implement
a money purchase pension plan either in addition to or in lieu of a profit sharing or
stock bonus plan. This predicament has contributed much additional complexity to
the process of retirement savings planning and administration, because a money
purchase pension plan is subject to rules and restrictions beyond those applicable to
profit sharing or stock bonus plans2 ° In many cases, the sponsoring employer adopts
and maintains two plans as a result of the 10 percent disparity between contribution
and deduction limitations, although only one plan is desired.31
Simplified employee pensions, because of their 15 percent of compensation
limitations, share this problem with profit sharing and stock bonus plans. If the SEP
rules were altered to permit employer contributions and corresponding deductions
up to the lesser of 25 percent of compensation or $30,000 per participant, employers
and plan participants could realize full tax benefits consistent with the I.R.C.
§ 415(c)(1) limitation in the most efficient and uncomplicated manner. If the SEP
rules were amended in conjunction with a statutory elimination of I.R.C. § 401(a)
defined contribution plans, simply altering the I.R.C. § 415(c)(1) limitation could
address any concerns about potential revenue losses resulting from increased use of
qualified plans. For example, the percentage component of the limitation could be
reduced from 25 percent to 20 percent, the inflation adjustment for the $30,000
"dollar" component could be retarded, or the full 25 percent of compensation
contribution allocation allowance could be predicated upon attainment of a certain
age and/or fulfillment of other conditions.3 2
29 I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A)(i) (1990) sets the deduction limit for stock bonus and profit sharing plans, but not
money purchase pension plans, at 15 percent of the participants' compensation.
30 For example, because it is a "pension plan", a money purchase pension plan must provide for fixed
contributions not geared to the employer's profits. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1990).
31 An employer, usually a professional having few employees, wishing, to contribute and deduct the
maximum amount in some but not all years may need both a profit sharing plan that permits contribution
discretion up to 15 percent of compensation and a money purchase plan to increase contributions up to the
25 percent of compensation limit allowed by I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(B) (1990). The contribution to the money
purchase pension plan remains fixed, but the profit sharing plan contribution can drop to zero if the
employer does not wish to effect maximum funding in a particular year.
32 For example, participants nearing retirement age who have only a limited number of years of "active"
participation in qualified retirement plans could be given a higher I.R.C. § 415 percentage limitation in order
to permit "catch-up" contributions. Cf., I.R.C. § 415(c)(4)(B) and (C) (1990), which permit special "catch-
up" elections for tax-sheltered annuity holders eligible for the tax benefits available under I.R.C. § 403(b)
(1990).
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Because of the manner in which the I.R.C. § 415(c)(1) limitation is expressed,
the 10 percent gap between its percentage component and the 15 percent deduction
limitations for simplified employee pensions, profit sharing plans, and stock bonus
plans becomes insignificant with regard to persons whose compensation is high
enough to invoke the "dollar" component of the limitation.Y Consequently, closing
the 10 percent gap may be of little interest to plan sponsors operating under current
rules whose key personnel earn substantial compensations. Likewise, plan sponsors
who would in no event contribute more than 15 percent of their participants'
compensation are not directly affected by this issue. Absent a change in the SEP
rules, those who would otherwise find a simplified employee pension attractive but
are concerned about this issue can proceed like plan sponsors attracted to profit
sharing plans: they can maximize contributions and deductions by adopting a
second (I.R.C. § 401(a)) qualified plan.M For the most part, however, the appeal of
the SEP would be greatly enhanced, thus avoiding much complexity, if its deduction
limits were directly coordinated with the I.R.C. § 415(c)(1) limitation.
DISCRIMINATION FAVORING HIGHLY COMPENSATED EMPLOYEES
Perhaps the concept generating the most complexity in the implementation
and administration of qualified retirement plans is the notion that contributions and
benefits must not inordinately favor highly compensated employees. 35 For conven-
tional plans, the concept pervades various plan features, including coverage criteria,
vesting schedules, contribution and benefit allocations, distribution options, and
virtually any flexibly applied right designed into a plan.36
As previously discussed, simplified employee pensions avoid complex non-
discrimination determinations pertaining to participation and vesting standards,
because coverage limitations are precisely defined and vesting schedules are not
permitted.37  However, I.R.C. § 408(k)(3) expresses a nondiscrimination rule
analogous to that of I.R.C. § 401 (a)(4), except that the SEP formulation specifically
states that contributions must "bear a uniform relationship to the compensation (not
in excess of the first $200,000) of each employee maintaining a simplified employee
3 The "dollar" limitation ($30,000) takes the place of the "percentage limitation" (25 percent of
compensation) once a participant's compensation exceeds $120,000 under I.R.C. § 415(c)(1) (1990) as of
the time ofthis writing. At $200,000 of compensation the "dollar" limitation equals 15 percent of compen-
sation.
34 Under I.R.C. § 415(f)(1)(B) (1990) multiple defined contribution plans are treated as one plan for
purposes of applying the I.R.C. § 415(c) (1990) limitation. I.R.C. § 415(k)(1) (1990) treats both I.R.C.
§ 401(a) (1990) and I.R.C. § 408 (1990) vehicles as "defined contribution plans. " Thus, an employer with
a simplified employee pension could increase contributions and deductions by implementing any other
I.R.C. § 401(a) (1990) plan, including a profit sharing plan as well as a money purchase pension plan.
35 The notion is expressed generally in I.R.C. § 401 (a)(4) (1990) and particularized respecting participation
coverage in I.R.C. § 410(b) (1990).
11 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401 (a)(4)-0 (1990) for a table of contents that provides a succinct outline of the various
problems primarily associated with the nondiscrimination concept.
37 I.R.C. § 408(k)(2) (1990) and I.R.C. § 408(a)(4) (1990).
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pension." 3" In effect, this stricture requires that contributions by an employer be
allocated among the participants' Individual Retirement Accounts using the same
percentage of compensation. This is a methodology that has always been allowed
for conventional retirement plans by virtue of I.R.C. § 401(a)(5)(B) and its
predecessor provisions.
Accordingly, simplified employee pensions cannot allocate contributions
using such methodologies as point systems, which often skew contribution alloca-
tions beyond strict compensation proportionality by giving credit for age, duration
of service, and other characteristics that vary greatly in most workforces 9 Of
course, this loss of plan design flexibility is of no consequence to the majority of
employers with conventional plans who, given the choice, have foregone the rigors
of constant monitoring for discriminatory effect, in favor of the simplicity and basic
fairness of allocating contributions strictly according to compensation earned.'
Consistent with this observation, there appears to be little reason why a legislative
restructuring of the SEP rules, even if accompanied by elimination of popular forms
of conventional defined contribution plans, should not retain the requirement that
contribution allocations be made uniformly according to the proportionate compen-
sations of plan participants.
In one important regard, the SEP rules already reflect a desirable adaptation
from I.R.C. § 401(a) respecting a traditional accommodation for highly compen-
sated employees under the nondiscrimination concept. I.R.C. § 408(k)(3)(D)
specifically incorporates by reference I.R.C. § 401Q)(2), which permits so-called
"Social Security integration" for conventional I.R.C. § 401(a) defined contribution
plans. The rules recognizing an employer's regressive contributions to the Social
Security system, by allowing a moderate skewing of plan contributions in favor of
highly compensated employees, are uniformly applicable to simplified employee
pensions, as well as other kinds of qualified plans. Thus, the SEP is equally
"competitive" with I.R.C. §401(a) plans on this point, and no benefit perceived to
result from "Social Security integration" would be lost if conventional defined con-
tribution plans were statutorily eliminated.
Simplified employee pensions dispense with one troublesome facet of the
nondiscrimination concept not connected with plan allocations of contributions.
Some conventional plans contain provisions that create a variety of distribution
3a I.R.C. § 408(k)(3)(C) (1990).
31 See Auner v. United States, 440 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1971), wherein the employer's point system for
allocating plan contributions led to the plan's disqualification for tax purposes.4
1 Presumably, if the attainment of age, length of service, education levels, and other criteria used in point
allocation systems are virtues to be rewarded, they should already be reflected in direct compensation levels
and thus are indirectly accounted for in contribution allocations uniformly based on proportionate
compensation. There may be little reason to further reward such attainments via allocations in deferred
compensation plans, at the expense of much complexity and the potential loss of a plan's qualification
status, if the same effect can be more easily accomplished by manipulating raises, bonuses, and the like.
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options exercisable by participants, or distribution alternatives under the discretion-
ary control of the plan sponsor. If these distribution features are found to operate to
the disadvantage of rank and file participants, a plan can have its qualified status
questioned under the general nondiscrimination rule of I.R.C. § 401(a)(4)."1 The
SEP avoids this problem because the I.R.C. § 408 individual retirement accounts
used in simplified employee pensions leave the issue of distributions timing and
method entirely to the discretion of the plan participants, sparing the employer from
potentially discriminatory applications.
CONTROL OVER PLAN ASSETS
Actually, an employer choosing to sponsor a simplified employee pension
loses most ministerial control over plan assets, not just control over the timing and
method of distributions. Under I.R.C. § 408(a)(2), the trustee for each individual
retirement account established in conjunction with a simplified employee pension
must be a bank "or such other person who demonstrates to the satisfaction of the
Secretary [of the Treasury] that the manner in which such other person will
administer the trust will be consistent with the requirements of [I.R.C. § 408].' '42
This rule makes it impractical for a simplified employee pension to use other than
an institutional trustee. Consequently, the widespread practice of employers
sponsoring I.R.C. § 401 (a) plans who name themselves or a key employee (often the
employer's principal owner) as trustee cannot exist under the SEP scheme.
In the event conventional defined contribution plans were to be statutorily
eliminated, retention of this rule would certainly create a boon for institutional
trustees. Fortunately, however, such circumstance would also remove many
employers and key employees from exposure to potential prohibited transactions
violations under I.R.C. § 4975 and its ERISA counterpart.43 Sometimes itis difficult
for employers or key employees who serve as trustee for small plans, in particular,
to appreciate that the assets so held are not simply another resource available forbusi-
ness or (worse) personal use by those in control. Persons who might have difficulty
with this proposition likely do not have a good understanding of the fiduciary ob-
ligations imposed upon trustees by ERISA § 404."
Pension policy makers and commentators who have expressed concern about
4' See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-4 (1991).
42 A nonbank trustee of an IRA must demonstrate to the Internal Revenue Service that it has sufficient
continuity, an established place of business, fiduciary experience, fiduciary responsibility, and financial
responsibility. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-2(b)(2)(ii) (1990) [incorporating by reference Treas. Reg. § 1.401-
12(n)(3) (1990)].
43 Of course, institutional trustees can still engage in prohibited transactions and violations of fiduciary
responsibility. However, they tend to be less subject to conflicts of interest and incentives for self-dealing
than persons who own the entity that makes contributions to a qualified plan orpersons who have an accrued
benefit under the plan.
4Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
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"letting the rabbits guard the lettuce" under the conventional retirement plan scheme
might welcome universal application of the IRA/SEP rule respecting trustee
selection.45 Retirement plan sponsors who might argue that mandatory surrender to
institutional trustees of control over plan assets would promote certain institutional
investment biases to the detriment of asset growth and/or stability should be
reminded that a great variety of institutional trustees for IRAs have, since 1974,46
competed for such funds. These institutions include not just banks, but brokerage
houses, insurance companies, and an array of investment fund enterprises. Undoubt-
edly all basic investment philosophies -- from stodgily conservative to creatively
aggressive -- are available to IRA/SEP investors, who, as individual account
holders, can freely change trustees. 47
Now that individual retirement accounts have existed for the better part of two
decades, one somewhat minor but frustrating problem resulting from the exclusive
use of institutional trustees should be addressed, even if the current SEP scheme is
not legislatively altered. This problem involves the difficulty some IRA holders
experience in effecting IRA transfers, especially direct trustee-to-trustee transfers."
To be sure, some IRA trustees find it convenient to delay and even discourage
such transfers. With respect to small accounts, the trustee's focus may be on the
administrative burden of the transfer. Respecting large accounts, the trustee may,
of course, be more concemed about its loss of substantial revenues otherwise
generated from the assets invested with it. In either case, the IRA customer might
benefit from a penalty-enforced rule that would require any IRA trustee to make a
prompt transfer or distribution upon request. Such a rule could be added to the grow-
ing group of federal tax provisions designed to protect and assist the taxpayer, rather
than the Treasury.4 9 By imposing a nondeductible penalty upon IRA trustees who
fail to effect a transfer or distribution pursuant to a written request within a
designated number of days following receipt of such request, all IRA holders,
including participants in simplified employee pensions, would be protected against
4
sSome might observe, in view of the recent savings and loan financial disasters, that institutional "rabbits"
can be as difficult to restrain as employers and key employees.4 6 Individual retirement accounts were introduced in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
47 Would a substantial increase in the number of participants having this freedom to change trustees
jeopardize the security of inordinately large amounts of pension assets? Absent a clear showing that
individual employees would be less adept at choosing trustees and sound investments than their employers,
there would seem to be no good reason to protect participants from themselves, any more than we now
protect them from their employers who control trustee and investment selection under I.R.C. § 401(a)
(1990) plans.
48 IRA funds can also be transferred without taxation to a new trustee indirectly, via a "rollover" involving
a distribution to the account holder and aredepositing with the new trustee within sixty days. Unfortunately,
I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(B) (1990) permits only one such rollover per year. This rule could be altered to permit
more frequent use of the IRA "rollover" in the event the SEP scheme were to be expanded.49 See e.g., see the voluminous set of rules under I.R.C. § 6103 (1990) designed to protect taxpayers against
breaches of confidentiality in the handling of tax information.
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inordinate delays in placing their funds with new institutions.' In particular, such
a rule would be a "fair price" for institutional trustees to "pay" if the SEP were to be
given statutory preference over conventional defined contribution plans, because in-
stitutional trustees would have a greatly expanded market.
INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS
Portions of I.R.C. § 408 impose restrictions limiting the application of funds
held under a simplified employee pension that do not apply to conventional I.R.C.
§ 401(a) plans. The latter plans, to begin with, can receive contributions in kind,
whereas an IRA created under a simplified employee pension can receive contribu-
tions only in cash.5" Some modification of this rule would have to occur if the SEP
were to become the only statutory alternative for qualified defined contribution
plans, in order to accommodate employee stock ownership plans52 and stock bonus
plans both of which are designed to receive direct contributions of securities issued
by the sponsoring employer.
Another portion of I.R.C. § 408 that currently affects the manner in which
assets are held under a simplified employee pension could just as well be extended
to all qualified defined contribution plans. Under I.R.C. § 408(m), investments in
"collectibles" 5 are treated as (taxable) distributions from an IRA. Certainly the
volatility associated with markets in collectibles, and the potential for self dealing
resulting from the personal appeal of collectibles, would continue to provide strong
sentiment for the preservation of this rule, 4 even if the statutory role of simplified
employee pensions were to be expanded. Indeed, if the SEP were to become the only
defined contribution vehicle for retirement savings, Congress might well consider
further restrictions on the kinds of investments that properly belong in a qualified
retirement plan. Presumably, after nearly two decades of viewing questionable plan
investments made in arguable violation of the fiduciary standards imposed by
ERISA, 5 the Department of Labor would now be in a position to suggest that certain
kinds of plan investments tend to invite trouble or otherwise promote loss of
5
o Currently, trustee delays in transferring funds must be addressed under the somewhat vague concepts of
fiduciary duty imposed on trustees by ERISA. See Section 404 of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
51 I.R.C. § 408(a)(1) (1990).
52 See I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (1990).
" "Collectible" is defined to include certain specific items, like antiques or gems, but is also defined openly
to include "any other tangible personal property specified by the Secretary [of the Treasury] for purposes
of this subsection." I.R.C. § 408(m)(2)(F) (1990).
5' This sentiment was not strong enough to prevent a recent amendment permitting an exception to the
"collectibles" definition for certain domestically minted gold coins. I.R.C. § 408(m)(3) (1990).
11 Aside from exercising general prudence in the selection of plan asset investments, investments chosen by
a fiduciary must be diversified "so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances
it is clearly prudent not to do so." Section 404(a)(1)(C) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
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retirement income security.56 In any event, a shift to a qualified plan scheme
embracing widespread individually-directed investment choices would invite a
serious look at potential statutory protections (as I.R.C. § 408(m) may now be
regarded) that promote long term investment stability.
One other rule of I.R.C. § 408 that directly affects how plan contributions are
invested is the direct prohibition against investing trust funds in life insurance
contracts. 7 The prospect for doing so under conventional I.R.C. § 401 (a) plans has
generated some measure of administrative complexity that is avoided under the SEP
scheme. Life insurance agents know that business persons who would not otherwise
purchase additional (or any) life insurance will frequently do so indirectly, through
qualified I.R.C. § 401(a) retirement plans, because premiums can thereby be paid
with deductible dollars.58
Unfortunately, the purchase of life insurance contracts by I.R.C. § 401(a) plan
trustees creates a conceptual difficulty that pits the primary purpose of life
insurance--providing death benefits to surviving beneficiaries--against the pri-
mary purpose of qualified plans--retirement income security during the remaining
life of ex-workers. Thus, the Internal Revenue Service has issued authorities
designed to limit the use of life insurance in view of this conflict.59 Ignoring the
limitations thus imposed creates another regulatory threat to a conventional plan's
qualified status6
Furthermore, the existence of life insurance in qualified plans can lead to much
confusion respecting the distributions taxation consequences of such under rela-
tively esoteric provisions of I.R.C. § 72.61 Otherincome tax complications resulting
from life insurance coverage under qualified plans also affect the immediate tax
posture of plan participants. 62 Overall, it is likely that insurance agents would be
6 One could cynically speculate that generally the kinds of investments that cause the greatest difficulty are
those involving the highest sales commissions for their promoters.
57 I.R.C. § 408(a)(3) (1990).
" The plan participant is currently taxed on the cost of life insurance protection provided under a qualified
plan. I.R.C. § 72(m)(3)(B) (1990). The amount taxed, however, is rather favorably determined under the
so-called "P.S. 58" rules set forth in Rev. Rul. 55-747, 1955-2 C.B. 228.
"' In general, the cost of ordinary life insurance contracts purchased for a participant under a qualified
defined contribution plan must be less than one-half the aggregate of contributions allocated to the
participant at any particular time. Rev. Rul. 66-143, 1966-1 C.B. 79.
'Disqualification of a plan implemented under I.R.C. 401(a) (1990) can potentially affect the tax posture
of all of the plan's participants, including many persons totally innocent of the acts or omissions that caused
the disqualification. I.R.C. § 402(b) (1990). Under the SEP scheme, if life insurance were purchased with
the funds accrued for just one participant, only that participant would have an adverse tax consequence,
since only his or her IRA would be disqualified under I.R.C. § 408(a)(3) (1990). This is another point in
favor of the statutory elimination of conventional defined contribution plans.
" For example, under I.R.C. § 72(m)(3)(C) (1990) the death of an insured participant necessitates an
allocation of the insurance proceeds between taxable (the cash surrender value of the contract) and
nontaxable portions.
I See supra note 58.
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more upset than would plan administrators by the prospect of a universal application
of the IRA/SEP prohibition against life insurance contracts.
Ironically, because of their sponsorship of investment funds, insurance
companies do generate some business from IRA placements, although their primary
product, life insurance, is excluded from IRA holdings. Thus, as competitors for the
widened institutional trustee market that would result from an elimination of I.R.C.
§ 401 (a) plans, insurance companies might better tolerate their losing a direct market
for life insurance contracts now purchased in I.R.C. § 401(a) defined contribution
plans.
Even if one were to accept the general proposition that life insurance, by its
very nature, should be prohibited from use in qualified plans, such a view would not
necessarily be incompatible with the assertion that life insurance is important
enough to merit expansion of tax benefits when used outside qualified retirement
plans. In other words, in the event the SEP scheme were to be mandatorily expanded,
with the prohibition against life insurance left intact, the best way to placate the
insurance lobby might be to liberalize some of the provisions, such as I.R.C. § 79,63
that currently restrict the tax benefits accorded life insurance in other contexts.
REGULATION OF DISTRIBUTIONS
As previously mentioned, the I.R.C. § 408(k)(4)(B) requirement that there be
no employer-imposed prohibition against employee withdrawals under a simplified
employee pension eliminates discrimination problems associated with an em-
ployer's control over the timing and method of making distributions under I.R.C.
§ 401(a) plans. In addition, this feature of the SEP scheme eliminates qualification
problems related to an employer's selection of distribution events. Conventional
defined contribution pension plans, profit sharing plans, and cash or deferred
arrangements under I.R.C. Section 401(k) all have distinct qualification criteria that
prevent distributions not occasioned by a "proper" occurrence." In particular, the
definition of "hardship" relevant to an in-service distribution from an I.R.C. § 401(k)
plan has generated a considerable amount of technical complexity 5 not experienced
under a simplified employee pension cash or deferred arrangement. 66
The I.R.C. § 79 (1990) $50,000 limitation on the tax-favored use of group term life insurance may belong
ripe for adjustment in any event. $500,000 might well be a more reasonable limitation in view of the
considerable inflation that has occurred since I.R.C. § 79 (1990) was enacted.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (b)(1)(i) (1990), Rev. Rul. 71-295, 1971-2 C.B. 184, and I.R.C. § 401 (k)(2)(B)
(1990), respectively.
's See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(d)(2) (1990).
Under I.R.C. § 408(k)(6) (1990), which creates the simplified employee pension version of a cash or
deferred arrangement, no parallel to I.R.C. § 401 (k)(2)(B) (1990) exists, because a simplified employee
pension consists of individual retirement accounts established directly for plan participants who are
permitted to effect distributions at will under I.R.C. § 408 (1990).
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If the SEP scheme were to be the only statutory choice for defined contribution
plans, should it be altered to impose distributions restrictions relating to qualifying
occurrences? One statutory mechanism already in place that discourages premature
distributions from conventional plans and IRA/SEP arrangements alike is the 10
percent penalty on early distributions imposed by I.R.C. § 72(t).67 Obviously,
raising the penalty tax thus imposed from 10 percent would further ensure that
qualified plans not be used for short term deferrals contrary to the basic retirement
savings concept promoted under such plans. Additional qualification-oriented
definitions of distribution events are probably both unnecessary and undesirable in
view of the relative simplicity68 of the I.R.C. § 72(t) approach, and its focus on
penalizing only offending parties without consequences to other participants.69
Expanding SEP usage would raise other interesting policy issues not so easily
addressed. Since 1974, I.R.C. § 401(a) plans have incorporated progressively
complex rules7' pertaining to the general requirement that a joint and survivor or pre-
retirement survivor annuity be provided as a distribution feature in order to protect
the surviving spouses of deceased participants. These rules have not yet found their
way into I.R.C. § 408, but might readily be considered for inclusion in a simplified
employee pension scheme designed to supplant conventional defined contribution
plans. Of course, the goals of simplicity and ease of administration are not
compatible with the survivorship rules. Certainly, those who would advocate the
social policy underlying the survivorship rules should be called upon to suggest
ways to simplify those rules in the event of their adoption into the SEP scheme.7 1
Yet another distributions-related policy consideration that should precede a
widespread expansion of SEP usage pertains to participant loans. I.R.C. § 408(e)(2)
and (4) create a calamitous tax result for any owner of an individual retirement
account who borrows money from the account or pledges the account as security for
a loan.7 2 Although participant loans have always been popular under conventional
7 Actually, "early", as used in the heading for I.R.C. § 72(t) (1990), is somewhat of a misnomer, because
penalty-free dishibutions can be made at any age, depending upon the circumstances. For example, under
I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(iv) (1990), casting a distribution in the form of qualifying equal periodic payments can
prevent imposition of the 10 percent penalty no matter what age the distributee has attained.
6 I.R.C. § 72(t) (1990) itself might be streamlined to eliminate any definitional difficulties, such as that
arising from the penalty exception of I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(iii) (1990) pertaining to distributions resulting
from disability. Compare I.R.C. § 72(m)(7) (1990) and Treas. Reg. § 1.72-17A(F) (1990) with the Social
Security definition of "disability" found in 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1988). Disability determinations made
under Social Security administration could be used for I.R.C. § 72(t) (1990) purposes if the I.R.C.
§ 72(m)(7) (1990) definition were wholly conformed with the Social Security definition.
69 See supra note 60, regarding the general desirability of the SEP scheme in contrast to the I.R.C. § 401(a)
(1990) qualification criteria approach, which can result in penalizing innocent participants.
70 I.R.C. § 401 (a)(11) (1990) and I.R.C. § 417 (1990).
71 For example, a rule could be devised that requires a distributee from an IRA to submit to the trustee a
signed, standardized spousal consent form containing a stipulated warning to the effect that certain forms
of distributions may ultimately affect the signatory spouse's own retirement income security.
I The entire account loses its "exemption" from taxation, otherwise available under I.R.C. § 408(e)(1)
(1990), if the account holder engages in any prohibited transaction set forth in I.R.C. 4975(1990). IR.C.
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plans, they have generated an inordinate amount of regulatory complexity under
federal tax laws,73 as well as other state and federal laws that govern lending
practices. 74 Fundamentally, borrowing from qualified retirement plan assets to
accommodate pre-retirement economic advantages or exigencies is at odds with the
basic purpose of providing retirement income security. At the very least, such a
practice jeopardizes retirement savings-to the extent of the participant's prospects for
default of repayment.75  Consequently, retention of the IRA/SEP bias against
participant loans should be deemed appropriate under an altered statutory scheme
that supplants conventional defined contribution plans with the SEP.76
Finally, retention of special tax treatment for qualifying lump sum distribu-
tions, now accorded I.R.C. § 401(a) plans under I.R.C. § 402(e), would have to be
considered under an expanded SEP scheme. Currently, this tax benefit is not
available respecting distributions from an IRA/SEP. 77 Over the years, Congress has
experimented with capital gains treatment, ten-year averaging, and now five-year
averaging as techniques to mitigate the tax bunching effect of lump sum distributions
from conventional retirement plans. After numerous interpretive rulings from the
I.R.S. pertaining to the definitional criteria of a qualifying lump sum distribution,78
as well as legislative attempts to "grandfather" abandoned techniques,79 we are left
with yet another complicated set of revenue rules. These frequently require a com-
putational tax benefit analysis, because even if a distribution qualifies as a Code-
defined lump sum distribution, the distributee must decide whether the permitted
income averaging actually offers a tax benefit in view of the distributee's particu-
lar tax posture.80
§ 4975(c)(1)(B) (1990) makes a direct loan between an IRA and its holder, who would meet the definition
of a "disqualified person" under I.R.C. § 4972(e)(2) (1990), a prohibited transaction. Under I.R.C.
§ 408(e)(4) (1990) pledging the account as security for a loan from a non-IRA source results only in
treating the amount pledged as a taxable distribution.
See I.R.C. § 7 2(p), in particular.
74 For a detailed discussion of the various regulatory complexities of participant loans from qualified
retirement plans, see Kovach, A Perspective on Participant Loan Provisions in Qualified Retirement Plans
After the 1986 Tax Act", 4 AKRoN TAx J. 129 (1987).
" Additionally, default of repayment creates adverse tax consequences for the participant who has secured
the loan with his or her accrued benefit, because the trustee's cancellation of the accrued benefit upon a
declaration of default creates a taxable distribution to the participant under I.R.C. § 402. (1990)
76 Elimination of participant loans could create problems for cash or deferred arrangements, because loan
programs are often included in such plans to induce rank and file employees to elect deferrals that, in turn,
permit highly compensated employees to take advantage of the plan without invoking discrimination
sanctions. See I.R.C. § 401 (k)(3) (1990). Apparently, some rank and file employees will elect deferrals only
if the money set aside can be"made available" indirectly via a loan program. Perhaps this problem could
be resolved simply by liberalizing the deferral ratio test of I.R.C. § 408(k)(6)(A)(iii) (1990) to permit highly
compensated employees to effect reasonable deferrals without the necessity of using a complicated loan
program as a "gimmick" to induce levels of participation that would not otherwise occur.
I l.R.C. § 402(e)(5)(A) (1990) does not refer to I.R.C. § 408 arrangements.
7 For example, the I.R.S. has struggled with the definition of "separation from service" as used in I.R.C.
402(e)(4)(A)(iii) (1990). Rev. Rul. 63-22, 1963-1 C.B. 88;.Rev. Rul. 69-647, 1969-2 C.B. 100; Rev. Rul.
81-:26, 1981-1 C.B. 200.
79 Tax Reform Act of 1986, 1122(h), Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986)
o Because the tax on lump sum distributions is a'"separate tax" according to I.R.C. § 402(e)(1)(A) (1990),
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The complexity stemming from the I.R.C. § 402(e) treatment of lump sum
distributions may, once again, be a good reason not to incorporate a lump sum
distributions preference into an expanded SEP scheme, especially in view of the
anomaly that I.R.C. § 402(e) does not universally produce a tax benefit, even for dis-
tributees of relatively modest economic means."1 Furthermore, because the lump
sum distribution tax treatment ostensibly offers at least marginal tax relief in many
instances, it may encourage full distribution of pension assets to the detriment of
ultimate retirement income security. Assets in excess of current needs left in a
retirement savings vehicle in orderto avoid standard taxation are, perhaps, less likely
to be squandered.
MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS
Retirement income security can be affected by any potential exposure of plan
assets to a participant's creditors. Thus, conventional retirement plans have been
given at least partial protection against such creditors under I.R.C. § 401(a)(13), a
provision not paralleled in the IRA/SEP scheme.2 "Partial protection" is a preferred
description for two reasons. First, I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) itself and Treasury Regula-
tions promulgated thereunder contain certain exceptions to the general prohibition
against alienation of plan assets, including rights in favor of former spouses83 and
the Internal Revenue Service.84 Second, I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) is frequently ignored
in bankruptcy proceedings involving a plan participant, because the policies
supporting the federal bankruptcy law often clash with those behind the prohibition
against alienation of plan assets.8
Perhaps it is appropriate that I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) protects a plan participant
against general creditors best when the participant is solvent and most likely to have
the ability to satisfy creditors out of non-plan assets. In such event, creditors may
not be able to use bankruptcy law to seize plan assets, the plan trustee will rebuff
collection attempts against those assets under the direct authority of I.R.C. § 401 (aX13),
and presumably creditors are left to pursue their interests against whatever assets the
debtor-participant might own outside the qualified retirement plan. However, if the
distributees having recognizable losses in a particular taxable year may want to refrain from electing such
special treatment and include a lump sum distribution into their regular gross income in order to "absorb"
such losses.
" A distributee under an I.R.C. § 401 (a) (1990) plan may wish to forego areduced tax available under I.R.C.
402(e) (1990), in favor of effecting a "rollover" to another qualified plan or IRA under I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)
(1990), thereby incurring no immediate tax at all on the distribution.
' I.R.C. § 408 only discourages a voluntary assignment in favor of creditors, and does not address
involuntaiy assignments effected under state law attachment procedures. I.R.C. § 408(e)(4) (1990).
'3 See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(B) (1990) and the I.R.C. § 414(p) (1990) definition of "qualified domestic
relations order."
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(2) (1990).
' See generally Seiden, The Bankruptcy Code and ERISA: Do They Conflict as to Whether a Debtor's
Interest in or Rights Under a Qualified Plan Can Be Used to Satisfy Claims and Expenses?, 3 BANKR. DEv.
J. 1 (1986).
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debtor-participant is insolvent, he or she will likely be drawn into a bankruptcy
proceeding, whereby plan assets will be put in jeopardy86 as a result of financial
conditions that make the ultimate building of retirement income security question-
able.87 Regardless of one's philosophical view of this process," there appears to be
no good reason why retirement assets accumulated under the IRA/SEP scheme
should be treated differently, since the purpose of such accumulations is precisely
the same as for conventional I.R.C. § 401 (a) plans. Consequently, an expanded role
for the SEP might well suggest creation of a statutory protection similar to that of
I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) so that creditors of solvent participants will likewise be forced
to exhaust non-plan assets without directly pursuing assets set aside as qualified
retirement savings.8 9 Indeed, a revised statutory expression of the sentiment now
expressed in I.R.C. § 401 (a)(13) might even attempt a clarifying coordination with
the federal bankruptcy rules. Such a move might parallel the manner in which the
"domestic relations orders" rules were added to I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) to clarify the
relationship between the general prohibition against alienation and the power of state
domestic relations courts to effect an equitable disposition of the marital estate 0
Another prospect for inquiry under an expanded SEP scheme is suggested by
the treatment of employee-derived contributions made under I.R.C. § 401 (a) plans.
Respecting such contributions made under cash or deferred arrangements, I.R.C.
§ 408(k)(6) would have to be amended to permit unrestricted access to the SEP
"salary reduction" feature if the SEP were to be made totally competitive with, or
supplant, cash or deferred arrangements now permitted under I.R.C. § 401(k).9'
With respect to employee-derived contributions not made under cash or deferred ar-
rangements, the complex nondiscrimination tests of I.R.C. Section 401(m) might
best be avoided under a modified SEP scheme by retaining limitations against such
contributions. 92 Under the I.R.C. Section 408 rules, the holder of an IRA cannot
" In particular, "self-settled" plans under the participant's direct control are subject to inclusion in a
bankrupt's estate. In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
87 The Bankruptcy Code does contain its own limited exemption for qualified plan payments made "on
account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor". 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988). However, even
the subsistence standard suggested by this exemption would not assist a younger participant not yet in or
near pay status under a plan.
" The view that plan assets should become part of a bankrupt's estate and be made available to one's
creditors outside bankruptcy proceedings supports keeping the SEP scheme free of restraints now
applicable only to conventional plans under I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1990). This is consistent with tax
simplification, but inconsistent with the notion that retirement savings in qualified vehicles ought to be
specially protected against a participant's own financial follies.
8 Should the Internal Revenue Service also be limited in this manner when pursuing unpaid taxes owed by
a plan participant? If so, we will need a statutory override of treasury regulations (Treas. Reg. § 1.401 (a)-
13(b)(2) (1990)) permitting the I.R.S. to do otherwise.
90 Because such situations involve conflicts of existing law, adding statutory clarification might well result
in overall simplification rather than the usual complexity that results from the addition of new qualification
features.
9' See I.R.C. § 408(k)(6)(A) and (B) (1990).
92 Under I.R.C. § 401 (m) (1990) large employee contributions from highly compensated employees can
create a prohibited discrimination against rank and file participants.
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directly contribute to it more than $2,000, 91 an amount likely insufficient to invite
nondiscrimination regulation attempts, even if simplified employee pensions were
to be greatly expanded in usage. 91 Perhaps allowing the $2,000 limit to be increased
gradually under an inflation adjustment clause95 would, under a revised SEP scheme,
assist in placating those who might lament the loss of the employee contribution
features now enjoyed under conventional retirement plans while avoiding a complex
nondiscrimination rule like that now contained in I.R.C. § 401(m).
At least two other concepts associated with I.R.C. § 401(a) plans should be
considered with regard to an expanded SEP scheme. The most hallowed of these is
the "exclusive benefit" rule,91 which, like the nondiscrimination concept, is simul-
taneously widespread in its potential applications and somewhat vague. Presuma-
bly, the rule has less potential application under the IRA/SEP scheme than for con-
ventional retirement plans, because an IRA is under the exclusive and joint control
of the plan participant and an institutional trustee. This circumstance affords em-
ployers fewer opportunities to use plan assets for purposes extraneous to the direct
benefit of the IRA holder. However, one area of regulation developed under the
exclusive benefit rule pertains to the return of employer contributions erroneously
made, and this problem can potentially arise under a simplified employee pension
as well as under conventional plans. Accordingly, rules like those set forth in
Revenue Ruling 77-20097 ought to be applied to simplified employee pensions even
though promulgated under I.R.C. § 401(a)(2).
The other concept to consider from I.R.C. § 401(a) plans is a provision from
Treasury regulations 98 that requires a profit sharing plan to be sustained with
"recurring and substantial" contributions in order to retain its qualified status. A
simplified employee pension operates much like a profit sharing plan, in that the
employer has year-to-year discretion to determine whether and to what extent
contributions will be made. 9 But under the "recurring and substantial" rule,
contributions that are too infrequent or too small will jeopardize the plan's qualified
status. If the simplified employee pension were to become the dominantly used
defined contribution plan, adoption of this rule into the SEP statutory or regulatory
I.R.C. § 408(a)(1) (1990).
The deductibility of individual contributions to an IRA is governed by I.R.C. § 219 (1990), which, if left
intact under an expanded SEP scheme, would continue to prevent deductions for such contributions in any
year in which the individual was an "active participant" in a simplified employee pension. I.R.C.
§ 219(g)(5)(A)(v) (1990).
" Inflation adjustment clauses are quite equitable when an Internal Revenue Code limitation is expressed
as a flat dollar amount. Yet, Congress can still easily use such devices to control revenue losses by simply
"freezing" the adjustments for designated periods under the provisions of future revenue acts.
I.R.C. § 401 (a)(2) (1990) states generally that a conventional qualified plan must contain assets held only
for the benefit of plan participants .and their beneficiaries. Similarly, I.R.C. § 408(a) (1990) states that an
IRA must exist "for the exclusive benefit of an individual or his beneficiaries".
97 1977-1 C.B. 98. The ruling permits an employer to retrieve plan contributions, subject to procedural
conditions, if such are made by reason of a mistake or fact or certain "mistakes of law."
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1990).
"Id.
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structure would surely tend to encourage SEP sponsors to make somewhat regular
contributions to their plans. Unfortunately, however, the "recurring and substantial"
rle as it now exists is simply another amorphous "facts and circumstances" concept
that leaves employers guessing as to their contributory obligations. For this reason,
it might be hoped that such a rule adopted into the SEP scheme would be expressed
in a form that leaves no doubt as to its potential application.,"
CONCLUSION
As new and complex regulations projects continue to be issued, and audit
activity respecting qualified retirement plans intensifies, 01 plan sponsors may in-
creasingly assume the view that creativity and flexibility in compensation planning
should be directed more toward direct compensation, and less toward qualified
deferred compensation. Because SEP plans, like I.R.C. § 401(a) plans, permit plan
contributions for any particular participant to be directly proportionate to that
participant's current salary or wages, the cost of such contributions can be indirectly
controlled by tinkering with direct compensation, without the need to implement an
unduly complicated retirement plan.1°2 Consequently, even if the SEP is not
statutorily improved, current and prospective plan sponsors must continue to ask
whether a complex retirement plan is really needed to effect their desired overall
compensation policies. Retirement system planners should not simply assume that
the participation, vesting, and other highly regulated features of conventional plans
have substantial economic value in all events. A careful analysis of these features
as applied to a particular workforce should always precede a rejection of the SEP
alternative.
Most interesting, however, are the possibilities for amending the SEP scheme
to make it even more competitive with conventional qualified plans. Both the public
and practitioners are starting to express great dismay over the increasing complexity
of the federal tax system. 0 3 An economic process as basic and important as
preparation for retirement income security should be accorded both substantial tax
benefits and ease of implementation and administration. As a general proposition,
there is no compelling reason why employers who choose a simplified retirement
plan format should not be able to get at least as good a package of tax benefits as those
who choose much more complicated vehicles. Amendments to the SEP statutory
structure directed toward tax benefit parity with conventional plans would be most
welcome.
IS For example, "recurring and substantial" could be defined as an average contribution of 3 percent of
participants' compensation in three out of any five years.
'ot See supra note 9.
102 An employer's discretion in selectively awarding bonuses and raises offers a much less complicated
means of implementing basic personnel policies intended to enhance employee loyalty, morale, and
productivity.
'03 See supra note 6.
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Ultimately, the simplified employee pension could remain as the only
qualified format for defined contribution plans; 10 however, amendments directed
toward that result should be sparingly made in order to meet the goal of offering
qualified plans that are indeed "simple." Qualified retirement plans cannot continue
to exist in a regulatory climate that threatens to approximate that of "tax shelters"
prior to the 1986 Tax Act. 105 When employers commit contributions to such plans,
they should be reasonably assured that the tax mechanics will work as expected.
In the event Congress were to move toward the statutory elimination of at least
some kinds of I.R.C. § 401 (a) plans, procedures should be developed to facilitate the
conversion of such plans into simplified employee pensions. Perhaps the normal
I.R.S. review process for plan terminations and mergers" could be modified to
"grandfather" the qualified status of conventional plans up to their date of conversion
to the SEP format. If conventional plans having a reasonably recent determination
letter could be converted without substantial further inquiry into operational defects
that might have arisen since their last determination date, plan sponsors would be
encouraged to effect prompt and efficient conversions and asset transfers. 7 In this
manner, existing plans, as well as those implemented anew, could enjoy relief from
the burdens of I.R.C. § 401.
"04 Perhaps the simplified employee pension could eventually replace even defined benefit plans, but the
technical problems in doing so are beyond the scope of this article.
'
05 At times it seemed that tax opinions offered with many investment prospectuses during the heyday of tax
shelters contained so much "boilerplate" that they basically stated only that the shelter would work if the
investor was not audited. Are we now approaching this condition respecting qualified retirement plans? If
so, we should hope that the remedy to the situation is easier to swallow than the I.R.C. § 469 (1990) remedy
devised for tax shelters.
I See Internal Revenue Service Form 5310.
07 As practitioners are aware, merely obtaining a favorable determination letter from the I.R.S. does not
assure that a retirement plan will retain its qualification. Operational violations of the I.R.C. § 401(a) (1990)
rules can begin almost immediately thereafter, and, in any event, new rules affecting a plan's qualification
status are promulgated with an alarming frequency.
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